



## Introduction

- ▶ Modern smartphones are widely used in corporate IT environments.
- ▶ They introduce new threats such as mobile malware.
- ▶ Most mobile malware seen in the wild tries to exfiltrate information of the user or aims at abusing premium messaging services.
- ▶ Even worse, also benign apps can be a threat (e.g. for user privacy).
- ▶ Anomaly detection methods have been successfully used to identify mobile malware.
- ▶ Drawback of current approaches: context- and trust-information about features is not considered.
- ▶ TCADS aims at adding context- and trust-related information to improve anomaly detection techniques to identify mobile malware.

## Motivating Scenario

- ▶ Emerging adoption of smartphones in corporate IT infrastructures puts sensitive company data at risk.
- ▶ The impact of mobile malware can be huge. The threat addresses
  - ▷ the smartphone itself (i.e. data on the device),
  - ▷ the corporate IT infrastructure it is used in and
  - ▷ the physical environment the device is used in (sensor sniffing attacks).
- ▶ Today, companies have little control over smartphones that are used within their corporate, IT infrastructure.
- ▶ There is currently no sophisticated solution available that allows to detect mobile malware based on anomaly detection.
- ▶ TCADS aims at providing a framework for monitoring smartphones to detect anomalies that are caused by mobile malware.
- ▶ Novel aspect: context- and trust-related information are considered during the anomaly detection phase.

## Requirements

- ▶ Distributed Feature Collection
- ▶ Centralized Feature Correlation
- ▶ Context- and Trust-related Analysis
- ▶ Policy-based Decision Making
- ▶ Flexibility and Extensibility of the Framework
- ▶ Lightweight Smartphone Extensions

## Architecture Overview




Figure: TCADS Highlevel Architecture.

- ▶ Feature Collector gathers features for anomaly detection.
- ▶ Feature Provider stores and manages collected features.
- ▶ Correlation Engine employs policy-based anomaly detection.

## Abstract Model




Figure: Abstract Model of TCADS system.

- ▶ Core Components
  - ▷ Building blocks to model relevant aspects of a domain.
  - ▷ Feature hierarchy by means of categorization.
- ▶ Context-related Components
  - ▷ Encapsulate context-information of features.
- ▶ Signature Components
  - ▷ To define patterns based on collected features.
- ▶ Anomaly Detection Components
  - ▷ Support to express anomalies based on collected features.
  - ▷ Integration of arbitrary detection methods.
- ▶ Policy Components
  - ▷ Simple policy to encapsulate domain-specific knowledge.

## Training and Testing

- ▶ Training based on policy to create device-specific profiles.
- ▶ Testing leverages profiles to employ anomaly detection.

## Trust Extension




Figure: Trust extended TCADS system.

- ▶ Trust extension adds Security Properties (*SP*) to every operation which is used to process or transmit a measured feature.
- ▶ Based on these properties, a reasoning of the feature's trustworthiness (i.e a Trust Level) can be performed by the Correlation Engine.
- ▶ The Feature Provider is responsible for performing the actual task of calculating the trustworthiness of every feature upon the mentioned *SPs*.
- ▶ In detail, the calculation is based on ratings of *SPs* and some intermediary steps:  $\{SPR, \{\omega\}\} \xrightarrow{r^F} SL \xrightarrow{t^F} TL_C$ .

## Example




Figure: Step-by-step flow of the example.

- ▶ (1) Training phase, (2) measurement of sensor activation and (3) transmission of stolen data.
- ▶ (4) IDS recognizes the increase of IP traffic, (5) solving of split decision, (6) alert generation.

## Conclusion and Future Work

- ▶ TCADS introduces trustworthy anomaly detection for smartphones.
- ▶ Conceptual model sounds reasonable, basic building blocks are implemented (based on open standard IF-MAP).
- ▶ Training and testing data is currently gathered to perform evaluation.